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Gender and the Boundaries of International Refugee Law: 
Beyond the Category of ‘Gender-Related Asylum Claims’ 
 
1. Introduction 
There are growing calls in the field of international refugee law to adopt a gender-
sensitive interpretation of the refugee definition contained in the United Nations 
Refugee Convention.1 A refugee is defined in the Refugee Convention as a person who 
“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country”.2 However, there has been no authoritative 
international adjudication on the source and scope of a gender-sensitive interpretation 
because the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to determine any dispute 
regarding the interpretation of the Refugee Convention has never been invoked.3 In 
practice therefore, the act of interpreting the refugee definition has been undertaken by 
 
1 Executive Committee UN High Commissioner for Refugees (‘ExCom’), General Conclusion No. 73 
(XLIV) – 1993 Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence, para. (d) and (j); ExCom General Conclusion on 
International Protection No. 77 (XLVI) – 1995, para. (g); ExCom General Conclusion on International 
Protection No. 79 (XLVII) – 1996, para. (o); ExCom General Conclusion on International Protection No. 
81 (XLVIII) – 1997, para. (t); ExCom General Conclusion on International Protection No. 87 (L) – 1999, 
para. (n); Alice Edwards, 'Transitioning Gender: Feminist Engagement with International Refugee Law 
and Policy 1950-2010' (2010) 29 Refugee Survey Quarterly 21; Jane Freedman, 'Mainstreaming Gender 
in Refugee Protection' (2010) 23 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 589. 
2 Article 1A(2) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 
22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (‘Refugee Convention’) (hereinafter the ‘refugee definition’). 
3 Article 38 Refugee Convention; although regional courts and international human rights monitoring 
bodies increasingly determine non-refoulement cases under their respective treaty provisions and thus 
play an indirect role in the development of international refugee law, none have the jurisdiction to 
interpret the Refugee Convention, see María-Teresa Gil-Bazo, 'Refugee Protection under International 
Human Rights Law: From Non-Refoulement to Residence and Citizenship' (2015) 34 Refugee Survey 
Quarterly 11. The Court of Justice of the European Union is the regional court most likely to provide 
direct guidance on the interpretation of the refugee definition because the definition of a refugee in EU 
Law is almost identical.   
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national administrative4 and judicial authorities and has led to inconsistent practice. In 
this context and with the aim to ensure consistency in gender-sensitive interpretation of 
the refugee definition, guidelines have been issued by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’)5 and States alike.6  
Although the adoption of gender guidelines demonstrates a general acceptance that 
gender is relevant to the question of who is a refugee, there is evidence that States have 
failed to adequately undertake the process of gender-sensitive interpretation.7 The 
impact of failing to implement gender guidelines comprehensively is potentially far 
reaching as existing guidelines include both substantive matters of legal interpretation 
and procedural concerns. Thus, guidelines serve to explain the role of gender/sex in the 
interpretation of the elements of the refugee definition, including having a well-founded 
fear, the concept of persecution and the absence of State protection, encourage the use 
of same-sex interviews or appeal hearings and enhance the giving of evidence. The 
failure by national administrative and judicial authorities to follow international or 
 
4 Although the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’) conducts refugee status determination 
in some countries, States have the primary responsibility to conduct refugee status determination; 
UNHCR is the UN agency whose duty it is of supervising the application of the provisions of the Refugee 
Convention by providing interpretative guidance in accordance with the Statute of the Office of the 
UNHCR adopted by the UNGA Res 428 (V) (14 December 1950) UN Doc A/RES/428(V) in conjunction 
with Article 35 Refugee Convention. 
5 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: 
Gender-Related Persecution within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (HCR/GIP/02/01, 2002) (‘Gender Guidelines’). 
6 See for example Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Chairperson Guidelines 4: Women 
Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution 1996; US Guidelines, Office of International 
Affairs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, regarding adjudicating asylum cases on the basis of 
gender 26 May 1996; UK Visas and Immigration, Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim 2010. 
7 Valerie L. Oosterveld, 'The Canadian Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution: An Evaluation' (1996) 
8 International Journal of Refugee Law 569, 582-583; Heaven Crawley and Trine Lester, Comparative 
Analysis of Gender-Related Persecution in National Asylum Legislation and Practice in Europe 
(EPAU/2004/05, May 2004); Hana Cheikh Ali, Christel Querton and Elodie Soulard, Gender Related 
Asylum Claims in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Law, Policies and Practice focusing on Women in 
Nine EU Member States (European Parliament 2012). 
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national gender guidelines is partly due to their non-binding nature.8 In practice, this 
means that there are limited individual remedies for the resulting lack of gender-
sensitive interpretation of the refugee definition.9 Furthermore, as policy instruments 
gender guidelines may be withdrawn at any time. In 2006, for example, the Asylum and 
Immigration Tribunal in the UK withdrew its Asylum Gender Guidelines. The current 
Tribunal Guidance Note on Child, Vulnerable Adults and Sensitive Appellants has been 
criticised because it is limited to procedural issues to ensure a fair hearing for vulnerable 
appellants and does not address the specific role of gender and sex in the assessment of 
a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason.10 In the current 
climate of domestic attempts to restrict the refugee definition,11 it is essential to 
consider whether the law of treaties may provide support for a gender-sensitive 
interpretation of the refugee definition. 
Existing literature has contributed greatly to the field of gender and refugee law by 
empirically demonstrating how the refugee definition is not interpreted in a manner 
which takes due account of gender in general and gender-based violence in particular.12 
This failure has led some scholars to suggest that gender should be included as an 
 
8 Efrat Arbel, Catherine Dauvergne and Jenni Millbank, 'Introduction: Gender in Refugee Law - from the 
Margins to the Centre' in Efrat Arbel, Catherine Dauvergne and Jenni Millbank (eds), Gender in Refugee 
Law: from the Margins to the Centre (Routledge 2014) 4. 
9 Some higher courts have found that the failure to follow their national gender guidelines renders a 
decision by the lower court unreasonable, see for example Elezi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), 2003 FCT 210. 
10 Christel Querton, ‘“I feel like as a woman I’m not welcome”: A Gender Analysis of UK Asylum Law, 
Policy and Practice’ (Asylum Aid 2012) 26-27. 
11 See for example former U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ decision in June 2018 to deny asylum 
claims based on domestic violence on the basis this constituted ‘private violence’, Matter of A-B- 27 I&N 
Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). 
12 See for example Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank (n 8); Jane Freedman, Gendering the International 
Asylum and Refugee Debate (2nd edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2015); Heaven Crawley, '[En]gendering 
International Refugee Protection: Are We There Yet?' in Bruce Burson and David Cantor (eds), Human 
Rights and the Refugee Definition: Comparative Legal Practice and Theory (Brill Nijhoff 2016). 
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additional ground in the refugee definition,13 and others to claim that ensuring a gender-
sensitive interpretation of the terms of the refugee definition is sufficient to address the 
failure.14 The approach which propounds a ‘gender-sensitive interpretation’ of the 
refugee definition is the most favoured in this scholarship,15 particularly as there is little 
political interest in renegotiating an international treaty and the subsequent risk of States 
explicitly narrowing existing terms of the Refugee Convention.16 However as Arbel, 
Dauvergne and Millbank noted in 2014, “the work of integrating considerations of 
gender into the centre of refugee law is incomplete”.17 
Thus, although it is generally accepted that a gender-sensitive approach is required in 
the interpretation of the Refugee Convention, the claim that there is a duty in 
international law to take gender into account when interpreting the refugee definition 
provides an original contribution to this field. The claim is particularly relevant in light 
of the non-binding nature of existing gender guidelines and scholarship emphasising the 
discretionary powers of asylum decision-makers.18 This assertion does not seek to 
overlook advances in international refugee law brought about by feminist engagements 
since the 1980s. On the contrary, it aims to entrench existing gender-sensitive 
 
13 Mattie L. Stevens, 'Recognizing Gender-Specific Persecution: A Proposal to Add Gender as a Sixth 
Refugee Category' (1993) 3 Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 179; Todd Stewart Schenk, 'A 
Proposal to Improve the Treatment of Women in Asylum Law: Adding a Gender Category to the 
International Definition of Refugee' (1994) 2 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 301; Joanna J. 
Kallinosis, 'Refugee Roulette: A Comparative Analysis of Gender-Related Persecution in Asylum Law' 
(2016) 6 DePaul Journal of Women, Gender and the Law 93; see also discussion in Thomas Spijkerboer, 
Gender and Refugee Status (Ashgate 2000) 164. 
14 Heaven Crawley, 'Gender, Persecution and the Concept of Politics in the Asylum Determination 
Process' (2000) Forced Migration Review 17; Deborah Anker, 'Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human 
Rights Paradigm' (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 133, 139. 
15 This approach is also preferred by UNHCR, UNHCR Gender Guidelines, para. 6. 
16 Binder Andrea, 'Gender and the Membership in a Particular Social Group Category of the 1951 
Refugee Convention' (2001) 10 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 167, 193. 
17 Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank (n 8) 14. 
18 Birthe Ankenbrand, 'Refugee Women under German Asylum Law' (2002) 14 International Journal of 
Refugee Law 45, 56; Jane Freedman, 'Women Seeking Asylum: The Politics of Gender in the Asylum 
Determination Process in France' (2008) 10 International Feminist Journal of Politics 154. 
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approaches into the conventional boundaries of this field. Accordingly, this article seeks 
to locate the need to ensure a gender-sensitive interpretation of the Refugee Convention 
in the legal obligation of States in light of the general rule of treaty interpretation.19 The 
article suggests that an approach to interpretation focused on the purpose and 
effectiveness of the Refugee Convention is warranted in international law and addresses 
some of the main concerns regarding the interpretation of the refugee definition from a 
feminist perspective. The precise scope and nature of the duty of States to take gender 
into account is identified through a dynamic approach to the interpretation of the 
refugee definition in international law by reference to international human rights norms. 
Overall, this article claims that the conceptualisation of a legal obligation in 
international law to interpret the refugee definition in a way that takes gender into 
account is inhibited by the development of a distinct category of ‘gender-related asylum 
claims’ within gender and refugee law scholarship. Consequently, this article presents a 
challenge to the borders implicit in the category of ‘gender-related asylum claims’ by 
revisiting the boundaries of international refugee law. 
The article starts by providing a brief overview of existing feminist scholarship in 
international refugee law and discusses the concepts of gender and sex and the creation 
of asylum categories in international refugee law. This is followed by the article’s main 
proposition, namely that the general rule of treaty interpretation in international law 
enables the identification of a legal obligation of State parties to the Refugee 
Convention to take gender into account when interpreting the refugee definition. A 
dynamic approach to the interpretation of the refugee definition is thus proposed which 
focuses on the purpose and the effectiveness of the Refugee Convention rather than its 
text and historical context. The scope of this duty in light of recent developments in 
international human rights law is then set out. To conclude, it is suggested to replace the 
 
19 Articles 31-32 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted on 22 May 1969, entered into force 
on 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (‘VCLT’). 
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conceptualisation of a category of ‘gender-related asylum claims’ with a wider legal 
duty of States to take gender into account when interpreting the refugee definition in 
most, if not all, asylum claims.   
 
2. Gender, Sex/Women and Asylum Categories in International Refugee Law 
This section will briefly review existing feminist critiques of international refugee law 
which centre principally on the text of the Refugee Convention, its historical context 
and the intentions of its drafters. An evaluation of feminist approaches is then provided 
and the case is made for moving beyond the category of ‘gender-related asylum claims’ 
in international refugee law. This leads to an exploration of the potential of a purposive 
and dynamic interpretation of the refugee definition in the following section. 
The 1980s saw an increasing focus on women and gender-related persecution to 
challenge the apparent neutrality and universality of international (refugee) legal 
norms.20 Early feminist critiques claimed that international refugee law developed 
through a male standard as “the male refugee was in the mind of the drafters”.21 In 
addition, scholarship often highlighted the absence of women from the 
plenipotentiaries22 and the use of the male pronoun in the text of the Refugee 
Convention.23 Scholars also pointed to the lack of reference to sex or gender in the 
 
20 Doreen Indra, 'Gender: A Key Dimension of the Refugee Experience' (1987) 6 Refuge 3, 3; Hilary 
Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin and Shelley Wright, 'Feminist Approaches to International Law' (1991) 
85 American Journal of International Law 613, 644. 
21 Anders B. Johnsson, 'The International Protection of Women Refugees: A Summary of Principal 
Problems and Issues' (1989) 1 International Journal of Refugee Law 221, 222. 
22 It may be relevant to note that a number of non-governmental organisations whose objective was to 
advocate for women’s human rights and gender equality attended the Conference of Plenipotentiaries and 
were represented by women including the International Council of Women, the Universal Alliance of 
Young Women Christian Unions, the International Federation of the Friends of Young Women and the 
International Union of Catholic Women’s Leagues. 
23 Johnsson (n 21) 222; Criticisms based on the use of the male pronoun generally ignore the principle of 
treaty interpretation that all authentic texts of the Refugee Convention have equal authority and that the 
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grounds for persecution in the refugee definition24 and in the non-discrimination 
provision25 as evidence of interpretation of the Refugee Convention through a male 
standard.26  
Refugee law scholars have examined the Refugee Convention travaux préparatoires as 
it may shed light on what the drafters intended the terms of the treaty to mean and place 
the treaty in its historical context. Scholars have claimed that there was strong 
international resistance to the inclusion of sex or gender as an additional ground for 
persecution.27 In addition, it has been suggested that the relevance of sex was rejected 
by the drafters of the Refugee Convention, both in relation to the refugee definition28 
and the non-discrimination provision.29 This initial stage in international refugee law 
and policy has been described as one of “complete blindness to women, gender, and 
issues of sexual inequality”.30  
Feminist critiques of international refugee law led to strategic efforts necessary to make 
women seeking asylum more visible within refugee law. Nevertheless, most scholars 
rejected calls for including gender as an additional ground for persecution in the refugee 
 
French text of the Refugee Convention defines a refugee using the female pronoun, Article 33(1) VCLT; 
see also the Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees 
and Stateless Persons, 19 July 1951, para. I. 
24 Article 1A(2) Refugee Convention requires that a well-founded fear of being persecuted arises “for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”. 
25 Article 3 Refugee Convention requires State parties to apply the provisions of the Refugee Convention 
“to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin”. 
26 Jacqueline Greatbatch, 'The Gender Difference: Feminist Critiques of Refugee Discourse' (1989) 1 
International Journal of Refugee Law 518; Heaven Crawley, 'Gender, Persecution and the Concept of 
Politics in the Asylum Determination Process' (2000) 9 Forced Migration Review 17; Freedman, 
Gendering the International Asylum and Refugee Debate (n 8) 74-75. 
27 C. E. J. de Neef and S. J. de Ruiter, Sexual Violence Against Women Refugees: Report on the Nature 
and Consequences of Sexual Violence Suffered Elsewhere (Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour 1984) 
61; Indra (n 20) 3. 
28  Edwards, ‘Transitioning Gender’ (n 1) 23. 
29 Nora Honkala, '‘She, of Course, Holds No Political Opinions’: Gendered Political Opinion Ground in 
Women’s Forced Marriage Asylum Claims' (2017) 26 Social & Legal Studies 166. 
30 Edwards, ‘Transitioning Gender’ (n 1) 22. 
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definition. They warned that creating a particular category of gender-related persecution 
claims may contribute to essentialising women’s experiences as apolitical and further 
excluding women’s asylum claims from “traditional” refugee claims.31 It is suggested 
here that although refugees are frequently persecuted for more than one Refugee 
Convention ground,32 advances in gender-sensitive interpretation of the refugee 
definition as a whole may be threatened as a result of conceptualising persecution as 
either gender-related or not. Advocating for an additional Refugee Convention ground 
ignores that gender is not just relevant to the reasons for persecution but also for all 
other elements of the definition, including the well-founded fear of being persecuted, 
the concept of persecution, state protection, internal relocation and country of origin 
information. 
Therefore, just as scholars warned of risks associated with adding gender as an 
additional ground for persecution, there have been unintended consequences arising 
from the consolidation of a category of ‘gender-related asylum claims’ through feminist 
advocacy and scholarship in the last forty years. The category of ‘gender-related asylum 
claims’ is generally equated with asylum claims based on a risk of gender-based 
violence such as rape, domestic violence, forced marriage, ‘honour’ crimes, female 
genital mutilation and trafficking33 for reason of membership of a particular social 
group.34 This conceptualisation reinforces the borders separating a seemingly 
homogenous category of asylum claims with explicit relevance to gender from other 
‘conventional’ refugee claims in international refugee law. This approach fails to 
 
31 Ankenbrand (n 18) 55-56. 
32 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and 
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (UNHCR 2019 (re-issue)) para. 66. 
33 See for example UNHCR Gender Guidelines, para. 3. 
34  Michelle Foster, 'Why We Are Not There Yet: The Particular Challenge of 'Particular Social Group'' in 
Efrat Arbel, Catherine Dauvergne and Jenni Millbank (eds), Gender in Refugee Law: From the Margins 
to the Centre (Routledge 2014) 17. 
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encompass the wider range of asylum claims involving race, religion, nationality or 
political opinion where gender also plays a significant role. Moreover, it renders 
‘gender-related asylum claims’ more complex in light of the lack of clarity and 
consistency with respect to the ground of particular social group.35 Accordingly, 
framing women’s asylum claims as a sub-set of asylum claims separate from the more 
‘conventional’ depictions of male political refugees has contributed to the prevalent 
narrative in feminist refugee law literature that asylum decision-makers fail to ‘fit’ the 
bounded category of ‘gender-related asylum claims’ into the refugee definition. Equally, 
this categorisation depicts ‘gender-related asylum claims’ as ‘special cases’ which 
require the boundaries of international refugee law to be pushed beyond its conventional 
framework.  
Thus, defining certain asylum claims as ‘gender-related’ obscures the role that gender 
may play in the risk of persecution in asylum claims not generally considered to be 
‘gender-related’. For example, the risks faced by many young men and boys of forcible 
recruitment by armed groups are generally perceived as political opinion asylum claims 
because objection to recruitment may amount to or be perceived as an expression of 
political opinion in the context of armed conflicts.36 However, it is also a highly 
gendered phenomenon.37 Similarly, asylum claims based on a risk of torture in State 
prisons are viewed as archetypal political opinion claims yet there is increasing 
 
35 Andreas Zimmermann and Claudia Mahler, 'Article 1A, para. 2 (Definition of the Term Refugee)' in 
Andreas Zimmermann (ed), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2010) 417. 
36 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 10: Claims to Refugee Status related to Military 
Service within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol relating to 
the Status of Refugees (HCR/GIP/13/10/Corr. 1 2014) para. 53. 
37 See statistics in EASO, Country of Origin Information Report – Afghanistan: Recruitment by Armed 
Groups, September 2016. 
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evidence of the use of rape and sexual violence against men.38  The categorisation of 
‘gender-related asylum claims’ reproduces the notion that gender is only relevant to a 
sub-set of asylum claims as opposed to a relevant matter across a continuum which 
requires consideration in most, if not all asylum claims. Finally, and most significantly, 
it inhibits the conceptualisation of a legal duty of States to take gender into account 
when interpreting the refugee definition as a whole. 
Further, the scholarly focus of empirical studies on women’s asylum claims has led to 
the blurring of the distinct concepts of sex and gender as ‘gender-related asylum claims’ 
are often equated with women’s asylum claims. As a result, the terms gender and 
sex/women have been used interchangeably.39 This approach is problematic in several 
respects. Firstly, although the relevance of sex and gender is complementary,40 retaining 
sex as a category in international refugee law in itself is valuable and necessary.41 As 
sex discrimination and structural inequality remain relevant in understanding violence,42 
using the terms gender and sex interchangeably obscures the relevance of sex as a 
distinguishing characteristic and a basis for discrimination, violence and ultimately 
persecution in international refugee law.  
Although regard should be had to both sex and gender to analyse international refugee 
law, the concepts are substantively and analytically distinct. Equating ‘women’s asylum 
 
38 See for example Oosterveld, Valerie, "Sexual Violence Directed Against Men and Boys in Armed 
Conflict or Mass Atrocity: Addressing a Gendered Harm in International Criminal Tribunals" (2014) Law 
Publications 109. 
39 Alice Edwards, Violence Against Women under International Human Rights Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2011) 15. 
40 Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis 
(Manchester University Press 2000) 4. 
41 Edwards, Violence Against Women (n 39); see also Joan Wallach Scott, 'Gender: Still a Useful 
Category of Analysis?' (2010) 57 Diogenes 7, 12. 
42 CEDAW Committee ‘General Recommendation No 19’ (29 July 1994) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, 
para. 6; Opuz v. Turkey (33401/02) [2009] ECHR 870, para. 200; Mudric v. the Republic of Moldova 
(74839/10) [2013] ECHR 685, para. 63; T.M. and C.M. v. the Republic of Moldova (26608/11) [2014] 
ECHR 26608/11, para. 59. 
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claims’ with ‘gender-related asylum claims’ limits a comprehensive understanding of 
gender as a relational concept requiring analysis beyond biological differences.43 Hence, 
it is possible to conceptualise gender as more than the differences between men and 
women whilst still acknowledging that gender-based violence affects women 
disproportionately. Finally, it conceals the experiences of men who may also have a 
well-founded fear of gender-based violence.44  
Rather than equating gender with women and/or sex, gender is more usefully 
understood as a social phenomenon in which identities are socially constructed.45 Thus, 
taking gender into account when interpreting the refugee definition involves an enquiry 
into “a set of cultural institutions and practices that constitute the norms and standards 
of masculinity and feminity”.46 In this frame, gender subordination is the valorisation of 
characteristics associated with masculinity, such as domination, strength, protection, 
aggression, public life, leadership and rationality, over characteristics associated with 
feminity such as submission, weakness, vulnerability, passivity, private life, care and 
emotion.47 Although MacKinnon suggests that this process of subordination may 
happen to anyone, we generally assume that it is natural for it to happen to those who 
identify as women.48 Importantly however, men who do not conform to expected 
standards of masculinity in a given society are also devalorised.49 In this sense, where 
violence against individuals is motivated and condoned for their failure to abide by 
gender norms in a given society, the concept of gender subordination is relevant to the 
 
43 Nira Yuval-Davis, Gender & Nation (Thousand Oaks 1997) 8. 
44 See for example R. C. Carpenter, 'Recognizing Gender-Based Violence against Civilian Men and Boys 
in Conflict Situations' (2006) 37 Security Dialogue 83. 
45 Sally Engle Merry, Gender Violence: A Cultural Perspective (Wiley-Blackwell 2009) 180. 
46 Christine Chinkin and Mary Kaldor, 'Gender and New Wars' (2013) 67 Journal of International Affairs 
167, 167. 
47 V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan, Global Gender Issues (Westview Press 1993) 5-8. 
48 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Only Words (Harper Collins 1994). 
49 R. W. Connell and James W. Messerschmidt, 'Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept' (2005) 
19 Gender & Society 829, 832. 
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interpretation of the refugee definition also in asylum claims based on sexual orientation 
and gender identity. According to Yuval-Davis, gender is thus comprised of relational 
categories and a proper understanding of gender thus requires examination of both 
masculinity and feminity.50  
The relational aspect of gender is also emphasised by Conaghan as a notion which is 
“not located in individual subjects but in the patterns and practices which gendered 
social relations produce”.51 Gender is thus not a static notion insulated from context and 
although each political and societal context is likely to ascribe different meanings to 
feminity and masculinity, most are characterised by the subordination of the former to 
the latter.52 Gender subordination however does not have homogenous effects because 
the content of categories of masculinity and feminity is constructed over time and place, 
and intersects with culture, religion, race, ethnicity, politics, class, sexuality, ability and 
age as multiple inequalities influence the exercise of subordination.53  
This section has demonstrated how the focus on the text of the Refugee Convention, its 
historical context and the intentions of its drafters and the use of the terms sex and 
gender interchangeably in feminist refugee law scholarship have implicitly contributed 
to a less obvious border separating ‘gender-related asylum claims’ from ‘conventional’ 
claims. Generally, current scholarship fails to more fully explore the capacity for 
dynamic interpretation of the refugee definition in light of the general rule of treaty 
interpretation in international law. Thus, the next section explores an approach to 
interpretation of the refugee definition focused on the purpose and effectiveness of the 
 
50 Yuval-Davis (n 43) 1; although Yuval-Davis uses the terms masculinity and feminity in the singular, 
the terms are endorsed throughout this article on the understanding that these concepts are imbued with 
different meanings and characteristics in different societies. 
51 Joanne Conaghan, Law and Gender (Oxford University Press 2013) 23-24. 
52 Carol Cohn, 'Wars, Wimps, and Women: Talking Gender and Thinking War' in Miriam Cooke and 
Angela Woollacott (eds), Gendering War Talk (Princeton University Press 1993) 229. 
53 Sylvia Walby, Jo Armstrong and Sofia Strid, 'Intersectionality: Multiple Inequalities in Social Theory' 
(2012) 46 Sociology 224, 224-225. 
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Refugee Convention in light of recent developments in international human rights law. 
This enables the claim that there is a legal duty of States to take gender into account 
when interpreting the refugee definition. 
 
3. A Duty to Take Gender into Account in the Interpretation of the Refugee 
Definition 
When national administrative and judicial authorities interpret the refugee definition, 
they are effectively seeking to establish its “true meaning”.54 In the absence of 
supranational jurisprudence regarding the definition of a refugee, the law of treaties is 
particularly relevant in ensuring consistency amongst States. The task of interpretation 
must thus be undertaken in accordance with the  general rule of treaty interpretation in 
international law, as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.55 The 
rule stipulates that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose".56  
Whereas some commentators have emphasised that having regard to the ordinary 
meaning of the terms in their context is the starting point in interpreting a treaty, this is 
nonetheless determined in light of the object and purpose of the relevant treaty.57 
Moreover, many scholars also emphasise the primacy of the requirement to interpret the 
 
54 Guy Goodwin-Gill, 'The Search for the One, True Meaning' in Guy Goodwin-Gill and Helene Lambert 
(eds), The Limits of Transnational Law: Refugee Law, Policy Harmonisation and Judicial Dialogue in the 
European Union (Cambridge University Press 2010) 216.  
55 Although the VCLT was adopted in 1969 and entered into force in 1980, after the Refugee Convention 
was adopted, its terms reflect customary international law, Reservations to the Convention on Genocide 
(Advisory Opinion) [1951] ICJ Reports 15, pp. 21-23. 
56 Article 31(1) VCLT. 
57 I. M. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd edn, Manchester University Press 
1984) 130; Rebecca M. M. Wallace and Olga Martin-Ortega, International Law (7th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 2013) 280. 
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treaty in ‘good faith’ as a fundamental principle of international law, meaning that 
States have to act in a manner which honours the spirit and letter of the law.58 The basic 
principle regarding observance of treaties thus explicitly requires State parties to 
perform their obligations in good faith.59 Overall, the approach to interpretation 
mandated by the VCLT has been viewed as a holistic assessment combining an analysis 
of the ordinary meaning of the terms of the refugee definition in  their context and in the 
light of the Refugee Convention’s object and purpose.60 
In interpreting the terms of the refugee definition, regard may also be had to 
supplementary means of interpretation but only insofar as they support rather than 
replace interpretation based on the general rule.61 Thus, supplementary means of 
interpretation may be used solely to confirm the meaning resulting from the application 
of the general rule of treaty interpretation or if the application of the general rule leaves 
the meaning ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable.62 Such supplementary means include the preparatory work of the treaty 
and the circumstances of its conclusion which includes the historical context.63  
As set out in the previous section, feminist scholarship in international refugee law 
emphasises the absence of sex and/or gender from the terms of the refugee definition. 
However, concerns regarding the absence of explicit reference to sex or gender in the 
text of the Refugee Convention, are partly answered by the proposition that a purely 
literal, or “objective” approach to interpretation, is not in accordance with the general 
 
58 Mark W. Janis, International Law (6th edn, Wolters Kluwer 2012) 28; James Hathaway and Michelle 
Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2014) 5; Eirik Bjørge, The 
Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties (Oxford University Press 2014) 70. 
59 Article 26 VCLT states that “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith”. 
60 Hathaway and Foster (n 58) 7. 
61 Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary 
(Springer 2012) 571-572. 
62 Article 32 VCLT. 
63 Wallace and Martin-Ortega (n 57) 281. 
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rule of treaty interpretation.64 The “ordinary meaning” of the terms of the refugee 
definition is but one of the factors to be considered in the interpretation of the refugee 
definition, it is neither determinative nor the primary mean of interpretation.65 
Accordingly, the absence of the terms sex or gender from the refugee definition does 
not necessarily entail that these concepts are neither relevant nor essential when 
determining who is a refugee. This claim is supported by the generally agreed view that 
recourse to the “ordinary meaning” of the terms of the refugee definition in their context 
is insufficient to elucidate its meaning due to the “minimalist provisions” of the refugee 
definition as a whole.66 Thus, any initial conclusion as to the meaning of the refugee 
definition and whether it applies to a particular asylum case would require confirmation 
or modification in light of the Refugee Convention’s object and purpose.67  
Moreover, feminist scholarship in international refugee law also appears to take the 
terms of the refugee definition and the intention of the Refugee Convention drafters as a 
starting point to interpretation contrary to the relationship between the general rule68 and 
the supplementary means of interpretation69 in international law. Reliance on the 
historical context and preparatory works should only occur in selected circumstances 
after the general rule of treaty interpretation has been applied and should not be 
considered as an alternative isolated from it.70 Overall, the use of the travaux 
 
64 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (8th edn, Cambridge University Press 2017) 707. 
65 Hathaway and Foster (n 58) 8. 
66 Hugo Storey, 'Persecution: Towards a Working Definition' in Vincent Chetail and Céline Bauloz (eds), 
Research Handbook on International Law and Migration (Edward Elgar 2014) 459; see also Terje 
Einarsen, 'Drafting History of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol' in Andreas Zimmermann (ed), 
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford 
University Press 2011) 49.  
67 Sinclair (n 57) 130. 
68 Article 31 VCLT. 
69 Article 32 VCLT. 
70 Sinclair (n 57) 116. 
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préparatoires to shed light on the meaning of the Refugee Convention can be “rather 
mixed”,71 not least where they are misinterpreted.  
For the reasons set out above, the next sections advance a purposive and dynamic 
approach to interpretation supporting the proposition that taking gender into account in 
the process of interpretation of the refugee definition is required in international law. 
 
3.1. A Purposive Interpretation of the Refugee Definition in light of the Context, 
Object and Purpose of the Refugee Convention  
A purposive approach to interpretation requires that the ordinary meaning of the refugee 
definition’s terms in their context be determined in light of the Refugee Convention’s 
object and purpose.72 In the absence of any reference to gender or sex in the Refugee 
Convention and the unsatisfactory results of a literal approach to the interpretation of 
the refugee definition, the requirement in international law to interpret the terms of the 
refugee definition in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty is 
essential in identifying the existence of a duty of States to take gender into account 
when deciding asylum claims. It is thus necessary to move beyond a focus on the terms 
of the refugee definition and instead adopt a holistic approach which gives credence to 
the context, object and purpose of the Refugee Convention. Although all of these 
elements must be considered as part of a single assessment in accordance with the 
principle of good faith, Cassese argues that the purpose of the treaty, in this case the 
Refugee Convention, is the dominant lens through which to interpret its terms.73 
 
71 Guy Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd edn, Oxford University 
Press 2007) 9. 
72 Also described as the ‘teleological’ approach, Jane McAdam, 'Interpretation of the 1951 Convention' in 
Andreas Zimmermann (ed), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2011) 82. 
73 Antonio Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2005) 179. 
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Accordingly, it will be argued below that a purposive approach to interpretation of the 
treaty requires gender to be taken into account when interpreting the refugee definition, 
even in the absence of explicit references to sex or gender in the Refugee Convention.  
The context of the Refugee Convention as set out in its preamble and annexes74 asserts 
its human rights orientation.75 The preamble of the Refugee Convention places 
emphasis on the “principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and 
freedoms without discrimination”76 by explicitly referring to the Charter of the United 
Nations77 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.78 Both of these instruments 
explicitly protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings 
without distinction of any kind, including on the basis of sex.79 In addition, the 
preamble reiterates that the United Nations has on several occasions expressed serious 
concerns for refugees and worked towards assuring “refugees the widest possible 
exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms”.80  
The preamble also serves as the starting point for determining the Refugee 
Convention’s object and purpose, which is to extend the protection of the international 
community to refugees81 and “to ensure the protection of the specific rights of 
refugees”.82 Overall, the humanitarian purpose of the Refugee Convention is to shift 
protection to the international community and ensure the basic human rights of 
 
74 Article 31(2) VCLT. 
75 Hathaway and Foster (n 58) 9. 
76 Preamble Refugee Convention. 
77 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 
1945) 1 UNTS XVI (‘UN Charter’). 
78 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) 
(‘UDHR’). 
79 Articles 1-2 UDHR; Article 1(3) UN Charter. 
80 Preamble Refugee Convention. 
81 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 71) 8. 
82 UNHCR, Interpreting Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, April 2001, 
para. 3. 
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refugees.83 Hathaway and Foster consider that a purposive construction of the Refugee 
Convention is consistent with its aim to strengthen the protection of refugees.84 Giving 
effect to the humanitarian purpose of the Refugee Convention thus requires a dynamic 
interpretation of its terms, in particular the refugee definition.85 This is explored in the 
next section.  
 
3.2. A Dynamic Interpretation of the Refugee Definition  
The general rule of treaty interpretation justifies a dynamic approach to the 
interpretation of the refugee definition. This entails a focus on the purpose of the 
Refugee Convention to ensure its effectiveness in light of present-day realities. The 
principle of effectiveness requires treaty provisions to be “effective and useful”, in other 
words the manner in which they are interpreted must ensure the appropriate effect.86 
Thus, if the refugee definition is open to two different interpretations, only one of which 
enables the Refugee Convention to have appropriate effects, good faith and the object 
and purpose of the treaty require that this latter interpretation be adopted.87 Reliance on 
the principle of effectiveness, described by Cassese as “plainly intended to expand the 
normative scope of treaties”,88  together with the purposive approach has led to a 
particularly dynamic approach to interpretation.89 By analogy with international human 
rights treaties,90 the Refugee Convention is a treaty containing objective obligations of 
 
83 McAdam, 'Interpretation of the 1951 Convention' (n 72) 90. 
84 Hathaway and Foster (n 58) 8. 
85 See for example Sepet & Anor, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2003] UKHL 15, para. 6; as endorsed in Hathaway and Foster (n 58) 11. 
86 Cassese (n 73) 179. 
87 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries’ (1966) II 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 219. 
88 Cassese (n 73) 179. 
89 Shaw (n 64) 710. 
90 Austria v Italy (1961) 7 CD 23; Artico v Italy (1981) 3 EHRR. 1, para. 33; Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Advisory Opinion on the Effect of Reservations on the Entry Into Force of the American 
Please cite as Christel Querton, Gender and the Boundaries of International Refugee 
Law: Beyond the Category of ‘Gender-Related Asylum Claims’, Netherlands Quarterly 
of Human Rights 2019, Vol. 37(4) 379–397.  
© The Author(s) 2019. DOI: 10.1177/0924051919884764 
19 
 
States to protect refugees from severe human rights violations in their country of origin 
rather than a treaty establishing reciprocal rights between States.91 The particular 
character of human rights treaties and the objective nature of States’ obligations thus 
influence the means by which the Refugee Convention must be interpreted.92  
In this context, a purposive and evolutive method of interpretation is justified, 
approaching the treaty as a living instrument to be interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions93 and to ensure that the Refugee Convention can continue to function within 
its “present social reality and contemporary legal context”.94 It is arguable that the 
parties to the Refugee Convention may have intended to give an evolving, rather than 
fixed, meaning to the refugee definition to make allowances for developments in 
international law.95 The Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries includes the 
recommendation that the Refugee Convention should “have value as an example 
exceeding its contractual scope”.96 Historically, the refugee regime has been sufficiently 
flexible since its adoption to address new forms of persecution taking into account 
 
Convention on Human Rights (1983) 22 ILM 1, para. 27-30; Soering v the United Kingdom (1989) 11 
EHRR 439, para. 87; Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (1995) 20 EHRR 99, para. 72. 
91 Einarsen (n 66) 40; McAdam describes the Refugee Convention as a “specialist human rights treaty”, 
Jane McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 
14. 
92 Ireland v the United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 25, para. 239; CCPR ‘General Comment No 24(52) on 
Issues relating to Reservations made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional 
Protocols thereto, or in relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant’ (11 November 1994) 
UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para. 17; Shaw (n 64) 710. 
93 Wemhoff v Germany (1968) 1 EHHR 55, para. 8; Tyrer v the United Kingdom (1978) 80 EHRR 1, para. 
31; Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330, para. 41; Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (1995) 
20 EHRR 99, para. 71; McAdam, 'Interpretation of the 1951 Convention' (n 72) 103-104. 
94 Hathaway and Foster (n 58) 6; see also Goodwin-Gill (n 54) 207, 220. 
95 Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) (Judgment) ICJ Reports 
[2009] 242, para. 64; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) (Judgment) ICJ Reports 
[2010] 14, para. 204. 
96 Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless 
Persons, 19 July 1951, Recommendation E. 
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gender such as domestic violence, forced marriage and rape for example.97 A dynamic 
approach to interpretation has also been applied to the Refugee Convention ground of 
particular social group for example to take account of changes in society.98 The 
particular nature of the Refugee Convention thus requires a dynamic approach to 
interpretation in order to ensure the effective protection of refugees in need of 
protection from human rights violations. A dynamic approach to the interpretation of 
the refugee definition suggesting the existence of a duty to take gender into account is 
possible in light of recent developments in international human rights law, which must 
be taken into account according to the VCLT. This is discussed in the following section.  
 
3.3 Relevant Rules of International Human Rights Law: Bringing Gender within the 
Boundaries of International Refugee Law 
Under the general rule of treaty interpretation, States are also required to take into 
account, together with the context, “any relevant rules of international law applicable in 
the relations between the parties” in interpreting the Refugee Convention.99 
International human rights law comprises “relevant rules” applicable between the 
parties to the Refugee Convention for the purpose of treaty interpretation. The norms of 
international human rights law must therefore be taken into account as an aid to 
interpretation of the Refugee Convention because the object and aim of both is the 
international protection of the fundamental human rights of individuals. As set out 
above, the preamble of the Refugee Convention reiterates the importance of the 
universal protection of human rights. The Refugee Convention itself is often described 
 
97 ‘New’ in the sense that these serious human rights violations had not traditionally been considered to 
amount to persecution; Susan F. Martin, 'Gender and the Evolving Refugee Regime' (2010) 29 Refugee 
Survey Quarterly 104, 107. 
98 McAdam, 'Interpretation of the 1951 Convention' (n 72) 104. 
99 Article 31(3)(c) VCLT; Loizidou v Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, para. 43; see also Nada v. Switzerland 
(2013) 56 EHRR 18, para. 169. 
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as a human rights instrument100 and although this is debated,101 the near universal 
acceptance of the human rights paradigm for the interpretation of the refugee 
definition102 supports the proposition that international human rights norms are 
“relevant rules” of international law for the purpose of interpreting the terms of the 
refugee definition together with the context.  
The use of the human rights paradigm in international refugee law has not always been 
uncontroversial. Some feminist scholars were critical of the use of international human 
rights law as an aid to the interpretation of the refugee definition. Crawley and 
Freedman highlighted the androcentric nature of international human rights law which 
brought the male perspective into the interpretation of the refugee definition.103 It has 
also been argued that the human rights framework privileges the public sphere generally 
occupied by men to the detriment of women’s activities occurring in the private 
sphere.104 Feminist scholars’ reluctance to utilise international human rights norms to 
interpret the refugee definition is rooted in the public/private divide whereby 
persecution or serious harm is considered to occur either in the public or private 
sphere105 and as a result, only the former is interpreted as coming within the ambit of 
the refugee definition.  
 
100 Erika Feller, 'Foreword' in Andreas Zimmermann (ed), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2011) vii; McAdam, 
Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (n 91) 14. 
101 Vincent Chetail, 'Are Refugee Rights Human Rights? An Unorthodox Questioning of the Relations 
between Refugee Law and Human Rights Law' in Ruth Rubio-Marín (ed), Human Rights and 
Immigration (Oxford University Press 2014). 
102 As first set out in James C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (1st edn, Butterworths 1991). 
103 Heaven Crawley, Refugees and Gender: Law and Process (Jordans 2001); Freedman, Gendering the 
International Asylum and Refugee Debate (n 12) 74-75. 
104 See for example Jacqueline Bhabha, 'Legal Problems of Women Refugees' (1993) 4 Women: A 
Cultural Review 240. 
105 Catherine Moore, 'Women and Domestic Violence: the Public/ Private Dichotomy in International 
Law' (2003) 7 The International Journal of Human Rights 93. 
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However, Hathaway and Foster note that there has been a “sophisticated evolution” in 
how international human rights law conceptualises gender issues.106 Acts originating at 
the hands of non-State actors are now considered to come within the legal responsibility 
of States to exercise due diligence.107 Accordingly, in the absence of state protection in 
the country of origin, non-state actors may now be conceived of as actors of persecution 
for the purpose of the refugee definition.108 The principle of due diligence as a positive 
obligation of States has now acquired the status of customary international law and has 
served to gradually erode the traditional conception of the public/private divide.109 
Consequently, many feminist scholars now support a human rights framework to 
interpret the Refugee Convention and as a benchmark to critique the manner in which 
asylum decision-makers interpret and apply international refugee law.110  
International refugee law is thus non-static, as it must be interpreted in light of any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. This 
approach stresses the requirement of taking into account developments in the 
international community’s understanding of concepts such as sex and gender which 
were not traditionally considered to be part of legal enquiry. More specifically, 
international human rights norms have evolved significantly to reflect a better 
understanding of the role of gender in determining relations of power. Hence, 
international human rights norms enable a reframing of the interpretation of 
international refugee law by defining gender as a socially constructed concept situated 
 
106 Hathaway and Foster (n 58) 423. 
107 UN Commission on Human Rights, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its 
Causes and Consequences on the Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of Violence 
against Women' (20 January 2006) E/CN.4/2006/61.  
108 See for example Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department Immigration Appeal Tribunal 
and Another, Ex Parte Shah, R v. [1999] UKHL 20, per Lord Hoffmann. 
109 Ronagh J. A. McQuigg, 'The European Court of Human Rights and Domestic Violence: Valiuliene v. 
Lithuania' (2014) 18 International Journal of Human Rights 756, 761. 
110 See for example individual contributions in Efrat Arbel, Catherine Dauvergne and Jenni Millbank 
(eds), Gender in Refugee Law: From the Margins to the Centre (Routledge 2014) (n 8). 
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in the relational rather than in the personal characteristics of refugees. Although 
understanding gender as a social construct may be perceived as irrelevant because it 
does not fall within the “boundaries of the strictly legal”,111 it does find support in 
recent developments in international refugee law and human rights law. The following 
passages provide a brief and non-exhaustive analysis of how international and regional 
human rights norms link the process of gender subordination to the nature, causes and 
responses to violence. 
In international human rights law, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (‘CEDAW’) Committee has explicitly recognised the 
differences in constructed notions of masculinities and feminities and has consequently 
highlighted the prevalence of unequal power relations between men and women.112 The 
more recent Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence 
against Women and Domestic Violence (‘Istanbul Convention’) similarly codifies the 
notion of gender as a social construct defined as “the socially constructed roles, 
behaviours, activities and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for 
women and men” into a regional human rights treaty.113 An intersectional approach to 
gender-based violence has been explicitly endorsed by the CEDAW Committee114 and 
the Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.115 Thus, those who are subordinated by gender dynamics do not all 
 
111 Conaghan (n 51) 27; see also Charlesworth and Chinkin (n 40). 
112 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (adopted 18 December 
1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13 (CEDAW); CEDAW Committee ‘General 
Recommendation No 25, on article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, on Temporary Special Measures’ (2004) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1//Rev.7, 
note 2. 
113 Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (adopted 
11 May 2011, entered into force 1 August 2014) CETS 210 (the ‘Istanbul Convention’), Article 3(c). 
114 CEDAW Committee ‘General Recommendation No 35 on Gender-Based Violence against Women, 
updating General Recommendation No. 19’ (2017) UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/35, para. 12. 
115 UN Human Rights Council ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, Juan E. Méndez’ (5 January 2016) UN Doc A/HRC/31/57, para. 5. 
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experience it in the same manner or to the same extent.116 The process of gender 
subordination therefore does not lend itself to fixing into a seemingly homogenous 
category of ‘gender-related asylum claims’. 
International human rights norms however are particularly significant for international 
refugee law as they identify unequal gender relations as a cause and continuation of 
violence. This in turn is relevant for the refugee definition and in particular for 
determining whether there is a well-founded fear of being persecuted. The CEDAW 
Committee has identified the relation between gender subordination and violence in the 
following terms: 
Traditional attitudes by which women are regarded as subordinate to men or as 
having stereotyped roles perpetuate widespread practices involving violence or 
coercion, such as family violence and abuse, forced marriage, dowry deaths, 
acid attacks and female circumcision. Such prejudices and practices may justify 
gender-based violence as a form of protection or control of women.117 
The CEDAW Committee more recently clarified that gender-based violence against 
women was rooted in “gender-related factors”, including “the ideology of men’s 
entitlement and privilege over women, social norms regarding masculinity, the need to 
assert male control or power, enforce gender roles, or prevent, discourage or punish 
what is considered to be unacceptable female behaviour”.118 Accordingly gender-based 
violence is implicitly or explicitly socially accepted and impunity is widespread.119 The 
text of the Istanbul Convention itself also attributes the reasons for violence against 
women to the “manifestation of historically unequal power relations between women 
 
116 Yuval-Davis (n 43) 8; see also CEDAW Committee ‘General Recommendation No 35’ (n 114), para. 
12. 
117 CEDAW Committee ‘General Recommendation No 19’ (n 42), para. 11; see also CEDAW Committee 
‘General Recommendation No 35’ (n 114), para. 10. 
118 CEDAW Committee ‘General Recommendation No 35’ (n 114), para. 19. 
119 Ibid. 
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and men”.120 The Special Rapporteur on Torture suggests that an act may be defined as 
‘gender-specific violence’ where the nature or purpose of the act is “aimed at 
‘correcting’ behaviour perceived as non-consonant with gender roles and stereotypes or 
at asserting or perpetuating male domination over women”.121 Accordingly, gender 
understood as a hierarchy of social power is an essential consideration to explain and 
understand the nature, causes of and responses to violence.  
These gender relations and the resulting personal experiences of dominance and 
oppression are further influenced by distinguishing characteristics such as sex, race, 
ethnicity, religion, class, sexuality and ability. This is because if gender differences are 
a product of social relations these differences vary in magnitude depending on the 
particular context. In this manner, unequal power relations and injustices become 
apparent by considering gender differences within a given society. Consequently, 
gender norms also constrain men to particular identities, statuses, roles and 
responsibilities.122 In practice, thus, asylum claims are rarely, if not ever, solely ‘gender-
related’ or entirely isolated from gender.  
The general rule of treaty interpretation in international law thus requires State parties to 
the Refugee Convention to take into account international human rights norms and how 
these norms conceptualise the relationship between gender subordination, the exercise 
of violence and human rights violations in asylum applicants’ country of origin. The 
existence of such a legal obligation is supported by the Explanatory Report to the 
Istanbul Convention which clarifies that the obligations to recognise gender-based 
 
120 Istanbul Convention, preamble and Article 3(a). 
121 UN Human Rights Council ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak’ (15 January 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/7/3, para. 30, 
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para. 6. 
122 Edwards, ‘Transitioning Gender’ (n 1) 41. 
Please cite as Christel Querton, Gender and the Boundaries of International Refugee 
Law: Beyond the Category of ‘Gender-Related Asylum Claims’, Netherlands Quarterly 
of Human Rights 2019, Vol. 37(4) 379–397.  
© The Author(s) 2019. DOI: 10.1177/0924051919884764 
26 
 
violence against women as persecution123 and ensure a gender-sensitive interpretation of 
the Refugee Convention grounds124 “do not go beyond the scope of application” of the 
Refugee Convention.125 
These recent developments in international human rights law have contributed to 
bridging the borders which excluded what was traditionally considered ‘private’ harm 
from the realm of international law. Thus, it is now accepted that gender-based violence 
may amount to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in international human 
rights law,126 international crimes in international criminal law,127 or a breach of the 
laws and customs of war in international humanitarian law.128 In the light of these legal 
developments, taking gender into account is perhaps most straightforward when 
interpreting the concept of persecution as contained in the refugee definition. 
Accordingly, it is now generally accepted that violence such as rape, female genital 
mutilation, serious domestic violence or trafficking may amount to persecution.129  
However, gender relations equally play an important role in determining the other 
elements of the refugee definition such as the availability of State protection and the 
Refugee Convention grounds. This is reflected in international human rights norms 
which highlight that gender dynamics impact on a person’s ability to seek protection 
from the State against violence. In addition, gender may intersect with other factors and 
identities to make it more difficult to seek accountability from perpetrators and obtain 
 
123 Article 60(1) Istanbul Convention. 
124 Article 60(2) Istanbul Convention. 
125 Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence 
Against Women and Domestic Violence, Istanbul 11.V.2001 (‘Istanbul Convention Explanatory Report’), 
para. 300. 
126 CEDAW Committee ‘General Recommendation No 35’ (n 114) para. 19. 
127 Articles 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
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State protection.130 The Istanbul Convention established for the first time in a regional 
treaty, an obligation of State parties to give a gender-sensitive interpretation to each of 
the Refugee Convention grounds meaning that asylum authorities must recognise and 
understand how gender can have an impact on the reasons behind the harm suffered.131 
Having regard to how those constructed identities interact with other distinguishing 
factors such as sex, race, ethnicity, religion, class, sexuality, age and ability reflects the 
interdependent nature of the different Refugee Convention grounds which rarely operate 
as distinct reasons for differential, discriminatory or persecutory treatment. For 
example, asylum applicants having a well-founded fear of persecution due to their 
sexual orientation or gender identity generally have their claims determined by 
reference to the Refugee Convention ground of membership of a particular social 
group.132 However, the reasons for persecution may be conceptualised as relating to 
religion or political opinion thereby avoiding the complexities associated with this 
Refugee Convention ground.133  
On the whole, an intersectional approach enables a more accurate and comprehensive 
understanding of reasons for fleeing thereby leading to enhanced interpretation of the 
refugee definition. Thus, what amounts to political opinion in a particular society 
depends on the context. As illustrated by a decision of the New Zealand Refugee Status 
Appeals Authority, Haines QC noted that “account must also be taken of how power is 
distributed and exercised in the particular society. The political opinion ground must be 
oriented to reflect the reality of women’s experiences and the way in which gender is 
 
130 UN Human Rights Council ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture’ (n 115) para. 9. 
131 Istanbul Convention Explanatory Report, para. 312; although the Convention is addressing violence 
against women specifically rather than the wider duty arising from the Refugee Convention itself to take 
gender into account as suggested in this article.  
132 Moira Dustin and Nina Held, 'In or out? A Queer Intersectional Approach to ‘Particular Social Group’ 
Membership and Credibility in SOGI asylum claims in Germany and the UK' (2018) 2 GenIUS 74, 75. 
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constructed in the specific geographical, historical, political and socio-cultural context 
of the country of origin”.134 
In certain societies, violence is exercised and justified or condoned on the basis of 
constructed gendered identities. In interpreting the refugee definition this context is 
essential in evaluating the risk of persecution on return, the availability of State 
protection and the reasons for the persecution. In other words, understanding violence to 
determine who is a refugee requires a situated analysis which recognises the effects of 
larger societal context on gender performance.135 Accordingly, international law 
requires asylum decision-makers to extend their examination of the context and 
circumstances on return to the country of origin or habitual residence from the more 
conventional categories of women and men to the roles, assumptions and expectations 
of feminities and masculinities in that particular society.136  
 
4. Conclusion 
This article has claimed firstly, that the general rule of treaty interpretation in 
international law discloses an obligation of State parties to the Refugee Convention to 
take gender into account in the interpretation of the refugee definition. Concerns 
regarding the absence of the terms sex or gender in the text of the Refugee Convention 
were addressed by a purposive approach to interpretation. Moreover, the case was made 
 
134 New Zealand, Refugee Status Appeals Authority, Refugee Appeal No. 76044, 11 September 2008, 
para. 84.  
135 Engle Merry (n 45) 3; See also Heaven Crawley, 'Engendering the State in Refugee Women’s Claims 
for Asylum' in Susie Jacobs, Ruth Jacobson and Jennifer Marchbank (eds), States of Conflict: Gender, 
Violence and Resistance (Palgrave Macmillan 2000) 98. 
136 It was noted for example that “identification of the most appropriate Convention ground or grounds 
requires the decision-maker to go beyond the information relevant to risk” in New Zealand, Refugee 
Status Appeals Authority, Refugee Appeal No. 76044, 11 September 2008, para. 74; Note also the 
extensive use of academic literature in New Zealand, Refugee Status Appeals Authority, Refugee Appeal 
No. 71427/99, 16 August 2000, para. 86-88. 
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for a dynamic approach to interpretation based on the particular character of the 
Refugee Convention as a treaty establishing obligations of States to protect refugees and 
the principle of effectiveness. Secondly, the scope of the duty to take gender into 
account in the interpretation of the refugee definition in light of the norms of 
international human rights law was explored. It has thus been proposed that the scope of 
this duty includes the requirement to take into consideration gender as a social construct 
as well as the relationship between gender subordination and the exercise of violence.  
The claim that interpretation of the refugee definition requires gender to be taken into 
account according to the law of treaties provides a novel conceptualisation of gender-
sensitive interpretation as a duty of States. This proposition may provide individual 
remedies for the demonstrated failure of States to follow international or national gender 
guidelines. It is envisaged that this obligation will be informed by existing international 
and national gender guidelines and will continue to evolve in light of developments in 
international human rights law.  
This approach to the interpretation of the refugee definition presents a challenge to 
reliance on the category of ‘gender-related asylum claims’ commonly made in 
international refugee law scholarship. In the literature and in practice, this approach has 
led to a rigid categorisation of a sub-set of asylum claims defined by the type of 
persecution or serious harm such as domestic violence, forced marriage, rape or sexual 
violence, trafficking, ‘honour crimes’ and female genital mutilation. The consequences 
of using the category of ‘gender-related asylum claims’ in this manner are that gender is 
assimilated to sex in a manner which inhibits the conceptualisation of gender as a 
relational concept and suggests that the gender-related element of asylum claims is fixed 
to the identity of refugees. It also conceals reliance on sex as a distinguishing 
characteristic of relevance to the exercise of discrimination, violence and ultimately, 
persecution.  
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Moreover, labelling certain types of asylum claims as exclusively gender-related 
obscures the existence of a legal duty of States in international law to take gender into 
account in the interpretation of the refugee definition. Such categorisation perpetuates 
the notion that asylum claims in which persecution or the reasons for it are gender-
related are outside the traditional framework of the Refugee Convention which require 
extending the boundaries of international refugee law to ensure their inclusion. Instead, 
adopting the concept of gender as located in the “patterns and practices which gendered 
social relations produce” rather than within individual subjects,137 allows the 
reconceptualisation of gender in international refugee law not as a fixed category of 
asylum claims but as a process by which inequalities and discrimination are created and 
preserved and violence justified and condoned. 
Overall, this article proposes a revision of the narrative that ‘gender-related asylum 
claims’ are particularly complex cases which asylum decision-makers must “wrestle 
with”138 or cases which must be considered outside the traditional boundaries of 
international refugee law. Locating a duty of States to take gender into account in 
international refugee law enables an enhanced and more inclusive interpretation of the 
refugee definition to the benefit of all refugees. Thus, gender may be more usefully 
considered as a continuum in asylum claims whereby the socially constructed identities 
that a given society assign to feminities and masculinities may be more or less relevant 
in a particular asylum claim. More specifically, examination of these factors enables an 
enhanced understanding of the likelihood of persons being subjected to violence, how 
they experience violence, its consequences and how the State and society respond to 
that violence. Failing to take gender dynamics into account when interpreting the 
refugee definition does not fulfil the objective of a consistent and inclusive standard for 
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refugee protection as it marginalises and disregards the individual circumstances of 
those who are disadvantaged in the exercise of their rights and freedoms by those 
gender dynamics. The significance of this analysis for the interpretation of the refugee 
definition is potentially far reaching across a wide spectrum of asylum claims.  
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